The syllogism as defined by Aristotle, Ockham, and Buridan

This paper discusses and compares a number of influential definitions of the syllogism in the history of logic. We start with Aristotle, and offer a dialogical interpretation of his definition of a syllogism in the Prior Analytics. We then briefly discuss Boethius and Robert Kilwardby, and finally focus on Ockham and Buridan’s respective definitions. What we observe in these authors over the centuries, especially with Ockham (but with the exception of Boethius), is a diminished focus on the pragmatic dimension of applying syllogisms in certain contexts, in particular but not exclusively dialectical/dialogical contexts. We also observe increased focus on the formal properties of the syllogistic system, in particular the notions of figure and mood (though not in Buridan). And thus, taken as a whole, this analysis may be taken to illustrate a general tendency to move away from logic conceived as a tool for specific applications, and towards a focus on logical theories conceived as objects of study in their own right